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Since 1 July 1975, Public Works Centers (PWC's)
have tilled their industrial fund customers on the
basis of stabilized rates. The effectiveness of this
rate stabilization is addressed using PWC San Diago as
the model activity.
The thesis (1) explores the policy of rate
stabilization with its advantages and disadvantages,
(2) attempts to determine whether budgeting is more
effective using rate stabilization rather than
previous methods and (3) assesses the impact of rate
stabilization en PWC management. The authors conclude
that the benefits of rate stabilization far outweigh
its shortcomings by providing significant management
incentives and a better system for budgeting. Sources
of information include official correspondence and
reports and interviews at DoD, NAVCOMPT, NAVFAC, PWC
San Dieao and its customer activities.
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Within the Navy's industrial complex lies control of the
readiness of fleet operating and support units. In the
Navy's budget each year, funds are programmed to overhaul,
maintain and repair ships, aircraft and real property, as
well as provide normal day-to-day services such as
transportation, heat, light and water. All of these
maintenance and day-to-day services are provided by the
Navy's industrial complex. The ultimate objective of this
system is to maintain a predetermined level of material
readiness. This level of readiness is greatly affected by
the ability of the industrial complex to achieve its mission
of accomplishing required work on all programmed units
within the funds provided by Congress. [Ref 7]
This thesis addresses the issue of the 'stabilized rate'
concept, a method of billing and reimbursement, as utilized
by the the Public Works Center (PWC) , San Diego, for the
Navy community it serves. The San Diego community is of a
size adequate to be analyzed by this thesis and PWC San
Diego is representative enough of all Public Works Centers
to be a surrogate for the entire PWC community.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

In the past years, in a climate of stabilized economic
conditions, i.t was a relatively simple matter to determine
that a certain number of ships required overhaul during a
given fiscal year and that a specific amount of work needed
to be done. By applying the rates for services of the
industrial activity that would accomplish the work, the
total cost of each overhaul was determined and appropriate
funds were budgeted and approved by Congress.
As the economic world began to experience rapid
inflation aided by various shortages in petroleum and other
materials, the industrial activities attempted to keep pace
by adjusting their rates upward to cover increased costs.
The natural outcome of all this was that appropriated
dollars were used up faster than expected and the end result
was fewer ships than programmed could be overhauled. This
directly affected fleet readiness and proved to be
embarrassing to ths Navy when dealing with Congress.
While increased costs were not the only reasons for
failure to meet overhaul, repair and maintenance program
schedules, this problem provided both the Navy Industrial
Fund (NI?) activities and customers a simple and
understandable excuse that masked other management faults.
[Hef 3]
Realizing the futility of achieving any change in the
funding system through Congress and the tremendous loss in
management control of any attempt to move the industrial
activities away from the industrial funding concept,
Department cf Defense (DoD) managers determined that only
two realistic alternatives were available, as follows:
1 . Continue to accept cost fluctuations tc the
appropriated funds and acknowledge that program goals might
not be met, cr

2. Use the NIF to absorb increases or decreases in
costs. [Eef 19]
As originally conceived, the NIF concept recovered all
costs of operations on an annual basis. As a start up
mechanism,, a working capital corpus (or pot of money) was
furnished each NIF activity. As the corpus was depleted by
paying salaries and other costs, it was replenished by
customer payments for purchased services. By using
traditional corporation accounting and management
techniques, the activity attempted to operate on a break
even or zero profit basis by adjusting the rates it charged
for services.
Rates changed very little during periods of stable
economic conditions as alluded to previously and by nature,
the rates were 'stabilized'. From this came the concept for
the second alternative, Hare Stabilization. Jnder this
concept industrial activiries establish their rates far
enough in advance to allow the customers to budget for the
next fiscal year's work and these rares are then frozen for
that entire fiscal year. Accordingly, an industrial
activity has to forecast rates as much as 19 months in the
future. If unanticipated cost increases occur, the
industrial activity must operate at a loss and this loss is
absorbed by the corpus. Furthermore, by the time a gain or
less is realized, the next year's rates have already been
set. As a result, the initial year's less is recovered in
the establishment cf the third year's rates. In effect,
this extends the industrial fund operation from an annual to
a triennial tasis. [Ref 7,3]
Overall, the policy of stabilizing the rate throughout




1. Customer activities obtain the number of units of
output planned for in the budget. [Ref 7,8,19,21]
2. Industrial fund managers devote closer attention to
the rate develop-ment process and management of the overhead
accounts. [Ref 19,21]
Given the inherent problems of continuing operations
during a period of double digit inflation, high level
support for rate stabilization grew. In 1975, DoD issued a
mandate that rates for all industrial funded activities
would be stabilized during FY 76 and that all customers
would be tilled on the basis of predetermined rates.
The rate stabilization program was implemented in the
Military Sealift Command in 1973, at the Naval Air Rework
Facilities (NARF's) on 1 July 1975, and at the Public Works
Center (except for direct labor charge) on 1 July 1975.
PWC's stabilized direct labor charges on 1 January 1976.
Ail other industrial fund activities implemented rate
stabilization en 1 October 1976.
THESIS CEJZCTIV:
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the
effectiveness of the rate stabilization policy upon the
Public Works Center, San Diego, and its customer activities.
This will be dene by:
1. Determination of the objectives of the stabilized
rate policy.
2. Deter Tina tion/evaiua tion of the impact upon the




3. Determination of the impact upon the management and
management processes at the PtfC and at the customer
act ivities.
THESIS APPROACH
The approach was two-phased. First a subjective
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of rate
stabilization to both the NIF manager and the customer
activity was made. Then, an objective analysis of budget
data was undertaken to determine if better budgeting
performance- is being achieved from rate stabilization. To
accomplish this analysis, budget data from before and after
rate stabilization was collected and personal interviews
were conducted with representatives of the following
activities during the period of May-June 1977:
1. Department of Defense (DoD)
.
2. Cf fice of the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT)
.
3. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NA7FAC)
.
4. PWC San Diego.
5. Customers of the PWC San Diego, such as:
a. Naval Station, San Diego
b. Naval Air Station, North Island
c. Naval Regional Medical Center, San Diego
d. Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado
e. Naval Training Center, San Diego




Public Works Center, San Diego (PWCSD) , has been used as
a surrogate tor all eight of the PWC's. PWC's report to the
Chief, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) , via
the appropriate Engineering Field Division. Their mission
includes the full range of public works services:
utilities, facilities maintenance, housing, transportation,
engineering services, shore facilities planning support and
all other public works support required by operating forces,
dependent activities and other commands located at and in
the vicinity of the naval complex being served by a PWC.
All the above support is provided on a reimbursable basis
except for engineering services, which are funded directly
by NAVFAC.
The stated policy concerning PHC's is that activities of
the Naval Shore Establishment will not duplicate services
that are available from existing PWC's and that all
activities will maximize the use of the PWC located in their
geographical area. [Ref 1]
Customers, therefore, are a captive audience of the PWC
and it is incumbent on the PWC managers to provide the most
service for the dollar to insure maximum reaiiness and
performance of the Navy's shore establishment. To help
achieve this goal, two major management tools have evolved;
the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) concept and Rate
13

Stabilization at NIF activities.
Sections B through G of this chapter provides a brief
outline of the NIF and PWC history and operational
procedures, while Sections I, J and K provide a deeper
exploration of rate stabilization with its attendant
advantages and disadvantages.
B. THE NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND AND THE NAVY PUBLIC WORKS
CENTER
The history of NIF goes back to the National Security
Act of 1947 and directly to the TITLE IV amendment to the
Act of 1949 which reguired the Secretary of Defense to
establish working capital funds in the Department of
Defense. Pursuant to this, the Navy Industrial Fund was
established in 1949 under the provisions 10 U.S. Code 2208.
[ Ref 5] This resulted in token establishment of a few NIF
activities, principally the printing stations. Supported by
the success of these early conversions and thoroughly
strengthened by the recommendation of the Hoover Commission
of 1955, many additional conversions were undertaken.
Typical other prospects for conversion were ordnance plants,
aircraft overhaul and repair facilities, public works
centers, naval weapons facilities, the Military Sealift
Ccmmand and shipyards.
From this meager beginning, NIF activities now do ever 5
billion dollars of business each year. The eight Navy
Public Works Centers account for over 400 million dollars of
the total. It is interesting to note that the success of
the PWC's has motivated the Army and Air Force into adopting
the industrial funded P'fC concept. Their pilot program in
this arena is a combined effort that establishes the San
14

Antcnio Real Property Maintenance Agency in the San Antonio,
Texas, area. This agency will provide real property
maintenance for four Air Force Bases and one Army Fort.
[Ref 33]
Operations and accounting procedures of the NIF
activities are governed initially by DOD Directive 7410.4.
[Ref 1] These regulations are further expanded in the Navy
Comptroller Manual [ Ref 2 ] with specific accounting
procedures for PWC's contained in the Navy industrial Fund
Handbook, NAVSO P-1713. [Ref 3]
The principle advantages of the NIF activity have been
described as providing:
1. More effective means of determining costs for goods
and services as a basis for billing customers.
2. Mere effective and flexible means for financing,
budgeting and accounting for operations.
3. Greater sense of responsibility and restraint in the
ordering cf goods and services based upon availability of
funds.
4. More direct and rapid control of the quantity of
support activities.
5. A more complete consumption type budget and
accounting structure by which costs cf goods and services
furnished may be budgeted and accounted for under the
program or function for which they have an end use. [Ref 4]
C. NIF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
15

Each HIP organization is different depending on its
mission; however, each one is built around the central
working capital or revolving fund concept. In simple terms,
this means that a central fund, i.e., 'corpus' provides
working captial to an industrial activity in sufficient
amount to finance operations until such time that
reimbursements from customers are received. These
reimbursements then fund continued operations.
Theoretically, once started, the NI? activity should be self
generating, i.e., reimbursements cover the cost of
operations.
The NIF system utilizes the market system of accounting,
i.e., accrual double entry bookkeeping. With the use of
this standard method of accounting, the tried and proven
concepts oz industrial managerial accounting are available
for close control of the system. The system makes classical
use of ledger accounts, assets, liabilities and equities
along with the resulting income statements and balance
sheet. The real strength of the NIF system lies in the use
of these accounting concepts due to the wealth of management
tools that go along with the system.
With any industrial organization, the supply of raw
materials to perform the job is critical to its success.
Without timely supply support, both costly delays and
dissatisfied customers are encountered. To help insure the
smooth flow of supplies, most NIF activities will have a
Material Department in their organization that performs both
the required liaison with the Navy's supply system and
direct procurement. The Material Department also
accomplishes the inventory function, operates shops stores
and follows up on material requisition. The necessity for a
good Material Department cannot ce over emphasized because
of the different type of material support required by a NIF
16

activity as opposed to a more normal naval activity.
Paramount to the success of material support is the
supply/NI? organization partnership that must occur.
Without this close working relationship, chaos will result.
D. PtfC ORGANIZATION AND SERVICES
The PWC's are an essentially civilian operation with
military leadership organized along standard guidelines
provided by NAVFAC. This means the success of day to day
operations lies with the civilian managers and the success
of long range goals and customer relations lies with the






3. Engineering estimating or services
4. Contracting




9. Utility services for fleet units




14. Housing operations or services
15. Water front services.
E. PWC CCST COLLECTION
17

The success or failure of any NIF operation rests with
its ability to properly collect costs. If improper costs
are collected, then improper rates are charged with
resultant errors in cost reimbursement. This becomes even
more critical under rate stabilization when poor cost
determination cannot be corrected by a rate change. Each
NIF activity has its own cost accounting system that employs
the accrual basis of accounting, double entry bookkeeping
and a cost estimating system.
Two important managerial objectives are achieved by a
well implemented cost accounting system:
1. The determination of the full cost of the product or
service and
2. Management control of cost center operations.
PtfC's use a job order costing system wherein each
element of direct and indirect cost is collected and
increased by an amount of applied overhead. These costs are
collected separately for each job and are the basis for
billing the customer. Overhead costs are divided into
production and general and administrative costs to assist in
their control. The PWC NIF handbook provides guidance on
collection and development of the various elements of cost.
[Ref 3]
F. PWC BUDGETING
Every NIF activity must prepare input to the annual A- 1
1
Budget, which is the DoD budget for all industrial fund
activities. This budget fulfills the requirement of keeping
the chain of command apprised of NIF operations and provides
18

a check tc all concerned that the industrial activities are
operating within targets.
The PWC's also prepare a financial and operating budget
using the same data. It is a plan of expected expenses,
income and financial condition for anticipated levels of
work. This budget is intended for use as a management tool
by the PWC. Besides serving as an operating guide to decide
en mix of operations, it also allows management to evaluate
performance through variance. No industrial activity can
operate successfully unless it has a realistic operating
budget. Without one, difficulties would arise when
attempting to project rates, manpower requirements,
workloads and required physical resources.
The importance of the A-11 3udget cannot be over
emphasized. As RADM Travers, the Deputy Director of Budget
and Reports, Department of the Mavy, stated to all PWC
Commanding Officers during a recent corporate management
workshop: major claimants receive funds for utilities and
other PWC services on the basis of the NIP A-11 Budget which
is generated by Do D approved stabilized rates established by
IF activities. Customer activities should complain to
major claimants if adequate funds are not received. [Ref
10 1
G. PWC JCB ORDER PROCEDURES
1 • =1^£2^2_21Z Service Authorization
Emergency/Service (E/S) authorizations are issued to
cover jobs requiring up to sixteen (16) man-hours of labor.
There is no limitation as to the amount of material which
19

can be used. However, under NIF regulations, any material
over $5 will be direct costed against the customer.
2. Minor Work Authorization
——
—
^-— ——— — — -
—
"- —
Miner Work Authorizations (MWA's) are orders to the
production shops to perform specific items of work requiring
no more than eighty (80) man-hours of labor. There is no
limit en the amount of material which can be used on a job.
MWA's and E/S's are both assigned pre-established customer
jot order numbers and are serialized for individual
identification.
3 • Standing Sstimat ed Job Orders
All work of a recurring nature such as janitorial,
snow removal, street sweeping, etc. will be authorized by
use of a Standing Estimated Job Order. These will be
prepared by the Maintenance Control Department and will be
funded by the customer each quarter. Standing Estimated Job
Orders are not limited as to the amount of labor and
material for which they can be written.
u
• Specific Job Orders
Any job of a one time nature (non recurring) which
exceeds the limits for either an E/S or MWA will be written
as a Specific Job Order. Specific Job Orders allow the
greatest amount of control since each one is assigned a job
number and costs are accumulated on each job individually.
Specific Job Orders may be accepted by the Public Works




When the scope of the job is difficult to define
and/or there are many variables, a Specific Job Order will
be written and accepted on a cost reimbursable basis. In
these cases, the customer agrees to pay the full costs of
the job even when they exceed the original estimate.
t. Fixed Price Agreements
Certain kinds of jobs can be so accurately
estimated that the PWC and customers will accept the job on
a fixed price basis. Cn these jobs, assuming the job is
funded before the estimate has become outdated and that the
scope of the jcb does not change, the customer pays the
originally agreed upon price.
Job orders are normally funded prior tc the
commencement of work with the exception of the standing
estimated jcb order which is usually funded quarterly, in
advance. The only exception to this occurs when the
Commanding Officer of the PWC issues a Commander's Ord=r to
perform the work. This happens under certain "emergency"
conditions whereby the customer provides a written promise
to forward funds to the PWC.
Hilling of the customers occurs at regular
intervals. 3illing periods longer than monthly ar€ rare
because this requires too much working capital to sustain
operations and the customer needs current information as to
his financial condition. Shorter than monthly billings are
also rare because additional billings require more PWC
overhead, i.e. more clerks or overtime. However, shorter
21

billing periods are allowable if the local corpus is
depleted and requires early reimbursement.
H. PWC CUSTOMER RELATIONS
No matter how it is done, each NIF activity must
establish a system of customer liaison that will bridge the
gulf of misunderstanding surrounding NIF operations. This
system cannot be solely a Commanding Officer's problem or as
in the case of a PWC, the Activity Civil Engineer's (ACE's)
problem. For success, it will require the support of every
NIF activity employee from laborer to the engineer. It is
no different than a private organization selling a product.
The PWC ACE is the middleman for successful liasion. He is
normally a military officer who can relate to customer
problems and is assigned a billet in the PWC organization.
From this vantage point, he submits customers work requests,
insures follow up, insures proper funding, provides material
status and does anything else required to keep the customer
satisfied.
RATS STABILIZATION
As a result of favorable top management analysis,
implementation of rate stabilization commenced on 1 July
1975 for all DoD industrial funded activities. [Ref 9 1 The
justification for implementation of rate stabilization was
basically to give customers of industrial fund activities a
firm price for goods and services that would not change in
the course of a budget year, thereby allowing the customer
to achieve his planned program. The essence of this concept
was set forth by an Assistant Secretary of Defense
22

(Comptroller) memo to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(FH) dated 4 August 1975 which said,
"Rate stabilization means that each activity will
establish a set of fixed rates based on its
approved budget. The rates will be used to bill
all customers for the goods and services they
receive from July 1 , 1975, thru September 30,
1975. The rates may be expressed as costs per
manhour; manday; unit of outout; unit of input; or
any ether manner which best suits the nature of
the effort. An activity may have as many rates as
is warranted bv its organizational structure and
by its diversity of workload. The rates will
encompass all overhead costs, labor acceleration,
direct labor and direct materials. . .A waiver of
the requirement to include direct materials in the
rate structure may be requested if material usage
.h unpredictable and not adaptable to tneis octn • pi
tvpe of standard pricing techniques now employed
by Defense stock funds. . .Fund activities should
begin immediatelv to set up such a system and to
adjust their charges to customers accordingly. If
conversion of ADP systems is a delaying factor,
bills should' be prepared by hand until the new ADP
orograms are put into operation." [ Ref 9]
A waiver exempting direct material from the rate
stabilization program was granted for PWC's.
The mechanics of rate stabilization are relatively
simple. Seven to nine months prior to the commencement of a
given fiscal year, the industrial activity publishes a rate
schedule for services it provides. Once established, this
rate schedule cannot be changed by the industrial activity
during the course of the fiscal year. The customer
activities then use this schedule to prepare their budget
for the fiscal year. If the customer receives all the
dollars he budgeted for, then he can buy all the services
planned because the cost of these services is fixed. If the
customer does not receive all the dollars budgeted, as is
generally the case, he can effectively manage knowing the
cost of various services will not be changed during the
course of the year.
Under the industrial funding concept an activity manager
provides a service to his customer, then bills the customer.
23

The activity manager uses his corpus to pay his expenses
incurred, and the customers' payments reimburse the corpus.
Prior to rate stabilization, the manager could control his
various rates throughout the year so as to adjust his
accounts to a zero year-end balance. After rate
stabilization, the NIF manager must now absorb any cost
fluctuations within the corpus, establishing a break-even
planning horizon for three years in the future. Since the
customer rates established in the budget preparation phase
are the ones that must be used during the execution phase,
the activity manager must closely scrutinize all factors and
forces which may in any way affect his costs during this
future phase.
J. ADVANTAGES 0? RATS STABILIZATION
Advantages can be summarized from the points of view of
the Navy (in general) , the customer activity and the
industrial activity.
1 • 1^.11 LR General
The initial and overriding advantage of rate
stabilization is that, with all other factors held constant,
the Navy can plan and budget into the future, knowing that
the services budgeted for can be accomplished if the dollars
are authorized by Congress for these services. This, then,
allows achievements of advertised levels of readiness both
in fleet ships and aircraft and real property maintenance.
These two factors, program achievement and fleet readiness,
were expressed best by RADH Travers when he said,
24

"It permits the customer to achieve his budgeted
program which was developed in Large measure based
upon certain operational" co mmitmen-ts levied oft him
by National Authorities." .... "The program
provides 'the Navy' a management capability
neretofore unavailable to effectivelv ana
efficiently Dlan the depot maintenance workload."
[Ref 7]
As a result, rate stabilization allows the Navy to
maintain an infinitely improved image before Congress. It
is no longer necessary to justify cost increases and
inflationary pressures to Congress in order to explain
failures in achieving program objectives. [Ref 19]
2 • Industrial Fund activity Customers
The advantage to the customer is the same as the
advantage to the Navy. On the micro level each individual
activity desires to achieve its planned program. It does
not desire to see precious maintenance funds devoured by
rate increases in utilities. Additionally, knowing that
rates are stabilized removes much of the guess work from
budgeting. [Ref 27]
3 • I nd ustrial Funded Activities
Advantages to NT IF activities ire identified by
several Quotes from RADM Travers as follows:
"Industrial activities will now be committed to a
stable financial plan for the entire year with
restect to revenues and expenses. ... their
execution can be measured aaainst this stable
financial plan to determine variances and, more
importantly, the reasons for these
variances
.
\ .. Increased productivity at our
industrial activities by virtue of the new program
stability." [Ref 7]
5Jith rate stabilization the cost estimatina rate, in
25

effect, becomes the billing rate. Therefore, the best
financial management talent available will be concentrated
in the budget (rate estimating) branch. Under the previous
system the best personnel were collecting costs, which is
not very exciting and did nothing to stimulate better
management. [ Ref 21]
Under the previous system, customers were billed and
costs collected on actual work performance, i.e., actual
hours worked and the only way to measure productvity was to
laboriously determine variances of actual costs versus
planned costs. Now that the estimating rate is the billing
rate, productivity becomes a direct measurement and
determines whether gains or losses are generated. [Ref 21]
Rate stabilization will provide new management
incentives to the NI? managers. It will require additional
long range planning and adherence to planned operating
budgets. When faced with these facts, better management
thinking and reduced overhead costs should result.
Management attention will also be directed to the market
place where the NI? manager will now analyze carefully both
the supply and demand of his product. [Ref 21]
K. DISADVANTAGES 0? RATE STABILIZATION
Disadvantages can be summarized from the same points of
view.
1 • 12.11 In General
As a program devised and sponsored by top
management, no major disadvantages to the Navy are alluded
26

to by any factions concerned with rate stabilization. In
depth research by the authors also failed to identify any
disadvantages to overall Navy objectives. Caution must be
excercised, however, by the Department of the Navy (DoN)
industrial fund managers to preclude the depletion of the
corpus Navy wide. Sufficient safeguards exist in the
reporting structure to alert managers of dangerously low
corpus levels. However, on a Navy wide basis, it is
expected that gains or losses from the aggregated NIF
activities will balance out. DoN managers must be able,
nevertheless, to recognize adverse trends in the corpus and
be prepared to implement corrective actions.
2 • Industrial Fund Act i v i ty_ Customers
The disadvantage of rate stabilization to customers
results from NIF managers inherent thinking that profit is
better than loss. As a result, NIF managers will prcbably
tend to be conservative in developing future rates,
resulting in a possible disadvantage to the customer of
opportunities foregone. In other words, dollars budgeted
for and received by the customers could go into NIF activity
profits through conservative rates, rather than achieving
their intended purpose of overhaul, repair and maintenance.
[Ref 23 ]
3 . Indu strial Fund Activities
One of the biggest disadvantages of rate
stabilization to the NIF activity is the requirement for the
NIF manager to rethink his corporate attitude. The NIF
system was originally established to take advantage of time
tested private industry management principles. Since
adjustment of rates in response to cost increases is the
2^

standard business approach, rata stabilization goes against
the NIP manager's training. [Ref 21]
Because of the three year time cycle of rate
stabilization, any positive management actions taken by a
HIP activity Commanding Officer will not generally be
realized during his tour of duty. Therefore, the basic
psychological incentive of seeing the fruits of one's labors
is removed. [Ref 21,23]
Another disadvantage that must be considered is the
retraining reguired of industrial fund financial managers to
think in terms of long range planning. No longer can the
activity comptrollers think in terms of quarter to quarter
planning to achieve zero profit, rather, they must lock up
to three years in the future. [Ref 21]
A specific problem to the Public- Works Center (PWC)
NIF manager is the extreme difficulty of forecasting many
different customer requirements. Ship and aircraft
overhauls are determined at system command headquarters
levels well enough in advance to allow realistic planning.
Conversely, the PWC Commanding Officer must deal with many
different types of customers from air stations to
commissaries, and ship-to- shore utilities to Arsa Audit
Service light bills. As the PWC customer activities change,
so does the area of maintenance concentration, making long
range (three year) planning extremely difficult. [Ref 23]
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III. 3DDGSTARY IM PLICATIONS OF THE RATE STABILIZATION
PROGRAM
INTRODUCTION
A principal stated objective of the rate stabilization
program was to improve the budgeting ability of both the
customers and the managers of industrial funded activities.
[Ref 7] If the rate stabilization program is to accomplish
this and enable the customer 'activities to oudget more
effectively, it must be shown that the budget data is
developed with a firm knowledge of the number of units of
output required through the course of the year.
This Chapter will review the data available frcm the
PWC, San Diego, to evaluate the effectiveness of the
budgeting process. The PWC budget, in this respect, will be
considered as a surrogate for the aggregated customer
activities of the PWC. This is a valid assumption, in that
the PWC must consider the requirements of all its various
customers in its evaluation of anticipated revenues and
development cf overhead charges, and to ensure sufficient
resources are available to support the total requirements.
[Ref 21 ]
3. IDENTIFICATION OF MEASURA3LE DATA
In order to objectively review the budgeting ability of
23

an activity, a comparison mast be made between the amount of
funds budgeted and the funds expended, as well as a
comparison between the distinct goods and services planned
(budgeted) and the amount actually consumed or utilized.
The PWC San Diego provides a myriad of services to its
customers. References 11 through 18 and 21 indicate that
many of these services are readily identified with a
discrete measurement of output. However, in many cases,
charges to customers are based upon input (resources
consumed)
, rather than upon output realized. The following
is a review of each of the major service categories orovided
by the PWC, to demonstrate whether or not it lends itself to
a discrete output analysis.
1 . Over hau l
,
Rep.a ir and Renovation Ser vice s
Although this category is a significant portion of
the customers' budgeted dollars, it does not lend itself to
a discrete output measurement. Costs are figured on the
number of direct labor hours required and charges are male
on the number of direct labor hours provided. Reviewing the
budgets and operating statements [ Ref 11 througii 13] and
through interviews [Ref 211, it has been determined that
there is no direct relationship between the number of iirect
labor hours provided in support of an activity and any
discrete output. Similar jobs may be found to require
significantly different numbers of direct labor hours
depending upon many factors, such as working conditions,
distance frcm the center and other relevant factors.
Therefore, items budgeted in this category will not be
evaluated in the budgetary implications but will be




2 • Transportation Services
The PWC operates all Navy motor transport in the San
Diego area and leases the vehicles to its customers. Lease
charges are computed on an aggregate of time, mileage,
maintenance required and type of vehicle. Since the PWC and
customer activities do not discretely identify the source of
costs as to mileage or other factors, discrete comparison of
budget to execution in this area cannot be made. [Ref 11
through 18]
3 • J t i 1 i t y Services
The PWC acts as a central clearing house for all
light, heat, water and power requirements to its customer
activities. The PWC either purchases or manufactures the
specific utility and distributes it to customers. It is in
this area that discrete units of output may be identified.
The budget of the PWC identifies certain requirements for
steam, electricity, water, gas, etc. in discrete units of
measurement and identifies a proposed total cost or revenue
for each category. [Ref 11, 12, 13, 14] Reliable
determination of the budget units is necessary in order to
accurately reflect the overhead charges which are to be
levied for the utility provided. Further, end-of-year
operating reports of the PWC reflect the number of units
actually delivered to, or consumed by, its customers during
the reporting period and the actual charges made for those
quantities. [Ref 15, 16, 17, 18]
Inasmuch as utilities is the only category which
provides this discrete input/output measurement, utilities
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C. IMPACT UPON CUSTOMER BUDGETING
Figure 1 identifies the major utility services provided
by the FWC to its customers. The data in Figure 1,
extracted from references 11 through 18, has been analyzed
for FY 75, FY 76, and FY 7T. FY 75 represents the last full
year without rate stabilization. While FY 7T was only one
quarter, the trends of improvement should be noticeable.
The data presented are percentages by which the end-of-year
totals differed from the amount budgeted, so as to remove
any prejudice which may be ascribed to end-of-year figures
being over or under the budgeted amount. The data are
presented for the discrete units of utility service as well
as the dollar amounts, so both requirements determination
and the costing of those requirements may be observed.
Appendix A provides a more detailed analysis and display
of data than presented in this chapter. The analysis in the
appendix, however, is limited due to the unavailability of
budgeted data for portions of FY 77. The data is displayed
as the actual units and actual dollar requirements, both
budgeted and expended. The appendix then evaluates the data
in a unique fashion to develop an overall budget
effectiveness 'index' for each fiscal year. The index
represents the percentage of deviation that the actual
end-of-year results were of the budgeted figures. This
concept, as presented in Appendix A, should prove valuable
to compare FY 77 with the previous years, as well as using
the index to compare other future years. Further, in that
the index considers all the various factors involved with
budgeting and planning effectiveness, it is proposed as a
standard to te used in comparing the budgeting efforts of
one year with those of another year. The indices for FY 75,
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FY 76 and FY 7T are displayed below:
YEAR DEVIATION FROM BUDGET
FY 1975 6.47%
FY 1976 10.943 (rate stabilized)
FY 197T 2. 20% (rate stabilized)
The extreme change in water and sewage in FY 76 may be
somewhat attributed to a program of correcting water meters,
which led to an increase in measured volume. When combined
with an unexplained heavy demand, a significant deviation
from the planned amount occurred. [Ref 16]
The FY 7T deviation in compressed air reflected an
increased demand caused by a high volume of ships in port.
[Ref 17] Other than the above exceptions, the ranges of
variances were fairly similar during the three years
demonstrating no improvement in the. ability to forecast
quantities.
However, an interesting observation may be made by
comparing resources predicted to dollars budgeted. There is
no apparent direct relationship in the FY 75 quantity to
dollar variances, in that while AC electricity usage
deviated by 8.2%, the customers' costs deviated by only 1.6%
and while steam usage deviated by 6.1%, the easterners'
costs deviated by 13.4%. Comparing FY 76 and 7T quantities
to dollars, however, a direct relationship may be observed.
This direct relationship of usage to costs would appear to
permit customer activity commanders to more effectively
manage resources during the execution of the budget.
Accordingly, while rate stabilization has not provided
customer activities a means to better predict resource
requirements, it has enabled them to more accurately predict
the financial impact of various courses of action.
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D. IMPACT UPON PWC BUDGETING
Ey requiring the NIF activity to establish its rates as
much as 19 months in advance of the beginning of the year,
rate stabilization issues a significant challenge to the
predictive abilities of the NIF activity managers. The
following demonstrates the difficulty of this prediction
task.
In late 1975 and early 1976, the PWC San Diego conferred
with the tranagement of the San Diego Gas and Electric
Company to determine what rate structure the company
anticipated during FY 77. In addition, federal government
representatives attended California State Public Utilities
Commission gearings on rate adjustment requests by the San
Diego Gas and Electric Company. Other relevant factors
considered while predicting rates included renovations
required to the PWC electrical distribution system,
anticipated wage scales for FY 77, overhead allocation rates
and the estimated amount of electricity that would be
bought. These factors and others were pieced together to
establish an estimated cost to the PWC of $66.00 per million
kilowatt hoar (mkwh) . However, as FY 77 began, many planned
rate adjustments were not approved by the PUC and rebates
for prior charges were made by the company. As a result,
the PWC, San Diego, has found its costs for AC electricity
to be considerably less than expected during FY 77 to date.
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In addition, Figure 2 displays an analysis of costs to
the PWC fox ether utility services for FY 75, FY 76, FY 7T
and FY 77 through March 1977. In that the amount of the
utility purchased or provided is a factor in determining
total costs, the cost to the PWC per unit of the utility is
displayed. Costs for each fiscal year are analyzed as
budgeted or predicted cost per unit and actual cost per unit
and the percentage variance is shown. The data shown have
been computed from references 11 through 18.
In FY 75, prior to rate stabilization, any cost
adjustments could be passed on to the customers so as to
minimize the effect upon the NIF corpus. During that year,
cost variances ranged from 2.6% to 27.4%. In all areas,
except fresh water and compressed air (or about 10% of the
total budget), actual costs were less than predicted
resulting in savings passed on to the customers.
In FY 76, with the implementation of rate stabilization,
problems occurred in the cost structure. While the
variances were less volatile than FY 75, ranging from 2.9%
to 17.2%, the directions were changed. Approximately 843 of
the budget experienced cost increases, representing
operating losses to the PWC of approximately one and a
quarter million dollars which had to be absorbed by the
corpus. [ Ref 16
]
FY 197T results, with the exception of compressed air,
differed from budgeted figures . by 2.7% to 22.0%. In all
cases, except fresh water, actual costs were less than
predicted. Under normal circumstances, this would have
represented a gain to the corpus. However, as part of the
i trplementation program of rate stabilization, customer
charges were levied at FY 76 rates. [Ref 12] Comparing FY
76 budgeted cost to FY 71 actual costs, it may be observed
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that in most cases significant increases were experienced.
AC electricity increases alone were 23%. Thus, due to the
unusual situation, the PWC corpus experienced another loss.
[Ref 17]
FY 77 actual costs for the first six months of operation
dc nor include adjustments charged the customer to offset
the losses cf prior years, so that rates charged to the PWC,
as shown in Figure 2, are different from those charged the
customers. The variances are more volatile than the three
previous years, ranging from 4.0* to 32.3^.. In almost ail
cases, actual cos-.s were less than predicted. This resulted
in a significant gain to the corpus and resulted in an
unprecedented mid-year rate adjustment approved by DoD
.
[Ref 24]
The purpose of Figure 2 is to display a measure of the
success to date of the PWC at predicting costs. While the
data are not sufficient to draw significant conclusions, a
conservative attitude may be noted whereby the PWC
anticipates the costs to be greater than actually occur. Of
the 36 rates analyzed, 26 rates were actually less than
predicted, with 7 of 9 lower in FY 75, 4 of 9 lower in FY
76, 7 cf 9 lower in FY 7T and 8 of 9 lower in FY 77. This
attitude toward conservatism is attributable to both the
stigma attached to financial reports which show a less to
the corpus and to the need to turn over the corpus
approximately 30 times a year. [Ref 21, 23, 24]
E. SUKMAFY
The analysis presented in this Chapter (and in Appendix
A from limited data available) demonstrates that the rate
stabiiizatior. program has met the goal cf enabling the
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customer activities to budget better for purchased services.
However, it does have deleterious effects upon the NIF




IV. MANAGEME NT IMPACT FROM RATI STABILIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The initial impact cf rate stabilization on NIF
management was traumatic due, in most part, to lack of
understanding by all concerned. This initial trauma could
have been lessened, had time permitted the following of
prcven guidelines for new system design and installation.
These guidelines are set forth by Dr. Robert Anthony and
Regina Herz linger in chapter 1 3 of their text M an age meat
Control In Non Profit Organizations. [ Ref 6] These
guidelines are summarized below:
1. PLANNING. Develop a plan for system design and
installation, including a timetable and as careful a
statement of responsibilities as is feasible.
2. ANALYSIS 0? OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION, Diagnose
the objectives of the organization, the existing control
system and the existing organization structure. This
analysis may reveal defects in the existing system and
organization structure, in part reflecting differences
between the real objectives and the objectives as they are
perceive! cy the organization. It may lead to a
reorganization.
3. INVENTOR? 0? CURRENT INFORMATION,




4. DEVELOP THE CONTROL STRUCTURE.
5. DEVELOP PROCEDURES.
6. TEST. Test the proposed structure and procedures,
preferably in one part of the organization. This provides a
concrete example which is essential in educating people as
to what the new system is all about.
7. EDUCATION,
program.
Develop and implement an educational
8. IMPLEMENTATION. If feasible, run all or part of the
new system concurrently with the existing system. As soon
as feasible, eliminate all obsolete parts of the existing
system. [Ref 6]
Due to the severe impact of double digit inflation, DoD
management chose to implement rate stabilization quickly,
which resulted in insufficient preparation and lack of time
for proper testing and evaluation of users. Rather than
implementing rate stabilization across the broad spectrum of
all NIF activities, it would have been better to provide for
a gradual build-up using valuable lessons learned along the
way .
A gocd topic for follow-on analysis would be to compare
the way in which rate stabilization was implemented with the
text-book method.
However, in spite of its poor start, many strong
management tools afforded by rate stabilization have now
taken hold. Research interviews indicate strong acceptance
by both the PWC and its customers. The following sections
of this chapter will explore management impact on the
princpal players of the rate stabilization game. The method
U1

for evaluating management impact was done in the form of
personal interviews at the various levels of management from
DoD to PWC San Diego customers. These interviews were
conducted jointly by the authors on two separate trips, one
to the Washington, D. C. area and one to the San Diego area.
All interviews used predetermined questions, followed by a
general discussion of the operating experiences to date. As
each management point is covered a reference will be cited
at the end of the paragraph to indicate what interview
produced that particular point. No attempt is made to cite
specific quotes, but rather to extract the critical
information contained in each interview.
B. IMPACT ON DOD
Rate stabilization has given DoD personnel an
interesting private industry management tool in the fcrm of
a pricing pclicy. In the formulation of each fiscal year's
guidance to SIF activities, DoD can now make a survey of the
nation's major economic indicators and come up with a
pricing f 3 n+ or for each SIF activity to apply to its rates.
This is a dangerous evolution because of the many factors
that affect any type of economic predicting but the strategy
provides the opportunity to include inflation and other cost
pressures in future budgets. [Ref 19] The chief management
tool afforded to DoD is, however, that rate stabilization
assures the approving authority that if they authorize a
spending program, it will get accomplished providing other
non-financial factors remain stable. [Ref 19] Because of
this benefit, Do D ' s dealings with Congress are made
infinitely easier. DoD is no longer placed in the untenable
position cf either not achieving planned programs or asking





Under current DoD dictates, gains or losses will not be
recovered only by the activity incurring them, instead the
gains or losses will be prorated uniformly over the entire
NIF activity group, such as all PWC's, all Shipyards, all
NABF's, etc. For example, if a PWC losses 8 millon dollars
during a given fiscal year, this loss will be recovered in
the third year by all eight PWC's, not just that one PWC.
The fallacy is that this policy minimizes management
incentive tc improve its individual performance. [Ref 21]
Rationale by DoD in support of this uniform distribution
of gains and losses is to avoid lower rates at one activity
that might attract customers from an activity attempting to
recoup prior losses. [Ref «1 9 ] This is not a factor for PWC
customers since they are bound by regulation to use their
geographical PWC for services. [Ref 1]
Physical restrictions, availability of skilled workers
and work force grievances preclude any great redistribution
of the overall NAHF and shipyard workload.
C. IMPACT ON THE COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY
NAVCCMPT feels that rate stabilization's most important
impact is that it protects the customer's budget, with any
perturbations occurring during a fiscal year absorbed by the
NIF corpus and not the customer's budget. [Ref 20]
Another benefit perceived by MAVCOMPT is the inability
of a NIF activity to adjust its rates prior to commencement
of a new fiscal year, thereby taxing the customer for
dollars he had no chance to budget for. [Ref 24]
It is also felt by NAVCOMPT that rate stabilization
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forces improved planning within a NIF activity. This is
caused ty the need to explain variances and take immediate
management action to bring them back: into line. [Ref 20]
With the NIF corpus now absorbing budget perturbations,
NAVCOMPT notes that increased attention is being focused on
NIF activity by Navy's top management which brings added
pressure on NIF managers to do well. [Ref 20]
NAVCOMPT sees rate stabilization bringing about
increased efficiency in NIF operations through better
prcjecticns cf future workload. In the past, a NIF activity
would plan for a certain level of production and then see
this level decrease because of inflation. The new workers
or machines obtained for the planned level would not be used
with a resultant increase in overhead and added pressure to
increase rates even further. Under rate stabilization, a
NIF activity can be reasonably assured that the planned
level of production will be achieved because the customer
will have the funds to pay for all approved services.
NAVCOMPT noted that no ship overhauls are being deferred
this fiscal year as evidence of this benefit. [Ref 20]
One problem that rate stabilization has generated for
NAVCOMPT is that adjustments to an activity-level budget
continues for several months at the Congressional and DoD
level, resulting in potential changes in planned programs.
Accordingly, close coordination is required between OSD,
NAVCOMPT, Major Claimants, NIF customers and NIF activities
during this period. [Ref 20]
D. IMPACT ON THE NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
Of principal concern to NAVFAC is the previously
4ii

mentioned uniform pay back of gains or losses. Under this
concept a gain generated by a particular PWC will not be
returned to the customers who provided the gain. It will be
returned to all PWC customers around the world. This is not
fair to the customer who has realized a loss in the
purchasing power of his budgeted dollars. The customer must
be allowed to recoup his loss by having the entire
contributed gain returned, not just one eighth cf it.
However, the biggest fault NAVFAC perceives in uniform
payback is the detrimental impact on management incentives
as previously discussed. [Ref 21]
NAVFAC is also concerned about the motivational impact
on its PWC managers. A feeling of hopelessness may be the
result of being locked in for three years. In other words,
a management decision now could wait three years before it
is proved or disproved. The PWC manager perceives no
immediate realizable benefit from rate stabilization. [ Ref
21}
Another distraction of rate stabilization is that if a
gain is generated during a year there is no immediate way to
return that gain. That has to wait for two more years,
which hampers relations with PWC customers. [Ref 211
3AVFAC recognizes the need to be conservative in rate
estimation. The rapid turnover in the corpus (20 to 50
times a year) by the PWC's reguires that they minimize the
possibility cf a loss. [Ref 21,23]
NAVFAC also expressed concern that rate stabilization
might destroy the economics of the NIF way of doing
business. For many years the Navy has asked its NIF
managers to work toward zero profit and live within their
small corpus. It is felt that rate stabilization might
erode the management principles that have been so carefully
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built up to achieve this goal.
On the positive side, NAVFAC feels rate stabilization
will improve its managers by making them look much more
closely at the market demand for their services. While this
was addressed prior to rate stabilization, it was among the
last factors considered when formulating budget estimates.
Now it must be of primary interest. 3y so doing, better
service should result because the PWC will be more familiar
with customer needs. [Ref 21, 24]
E. IMPACT ON PUBLIC WORKS CENTER, SAN DIEGO
To the PWC, rate stabilization provides for improved
customer relations. The customer knows that with rates
constant, one variable is eliminated. [Ref 23]
All levels of PWC management believe rate stabilization
is a better way of doing business but they are especially
concerned with the difficulties in predicting utility rates,
because this is predicated on a number of primary factors
over which the PWC has no control. [Ref 23]
One disturbing aspect of operating with stabilized rates
and a small corpus is the advent of unpredicted requirements
after rates have been set. Almost any requirement added or
subtracted from the planned operation will cause a gain or
loss to be generated. A loss means a strain on the corpus
while a gain means bad publicity. This especially hurts PWC
operations as opposed to shipyards or NARF's, because the
workload is much less structured and the number of customers
many times greater. [Ref 23]
Rate stabilization has caused a definite change in the
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way PWC San Diego does business. The necessity of tetter
long range planning is paramount. As a result, more overall
PWC policy and guidance is imposed on department heads to
aid in planning and budgeting. Prior to rate stabilization,
a departmental head did not have to consider overall PWC
policy until it actually affected him since he could adjust
his rates if the policy dictated this to be necessary. [ Ref
24 ]
The Comptroller organization at PWCSD is strongly in
favor of rate stabilization and has already identified a
reduction in overhead costs of about one half million
dollars for FY 77 as a result of more intensive management
review cf overhead expense accounts. This reduction is
directly attributable to the effects of rate stabilization.
[Ref 24]
Even though the detrimental management aspects of
uniform paytack by the activity group did not personally
bother the PWCSD Comptroller, a significant problem was
uncovered when discussing this subject. This evolved around
the administrative burden created by uniform payback.
NAVFAC will have to expedite its analysis of gains and
losses frcm all eight PWC's and effect proper distribution
back to centers in time for them to get their rates to the
customers for use in budget preparation. [Ref 24]
PWC CUSTOMER IMPACT
Extensive interviews at many customer activities point
out the cact that for the most part the customer does not
knew what is the real benefit of rate stabilization. They
do realize that budgeting has been made easier because costs
are now a constant. What is not comprehended, is the
47

opportunity to achieve fall funding for PWC services, since
their major claimants receive these funds on the basis of
the NIF A-11 Budget. Therefore, if the customer input to
the PWC is an accurate reflection of his needs and this
requirement is carried forward in the A-11 Budget, then upon
approval of the budget there should be no reason for a
customer to be faced with a fund shortage for PWC services.
This failure tc comprehend the true benefit of rate
stabilization occurs because the major claimants present an
image of level funding. As long as this image persists, the
customer uses rate stabilization only to determine how much
of a certain service he can have accomplished and net for
overall planning and budgeting. Unless this image of level
funding is erased, the concept of rate stabilization will
not be fully utilized. [Ref 27 through 32]
Also apparent in the course of the interviews was the
fact that the customers relied almost entirely on PWC
historical records to prepare their own budgets. This
confirms that the PWC budget is an excellent surrogate in
this study for the customers budget.
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7 « CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS IN GENERAL
1 . The concern expressed by many of those interviewed
that the integrity of the NIF management is jeopardized by
rate stabilization is unfounded. The principles of rate
stabilization are similar to those principles governing the
operations of a regulated utility or transportation company
which cannot adjust its rates without the approval of a
public commission. In time, it is expected that all NI?
managers will adjust to this concept and rate stabilization
will become the routine and accented method of business.
B. CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO PWC'S
1. Rate stabilization is an effective management and
budgeting tccl for Public Works Centers and their customer
activities.
2. Fiscal planning emphasis within PWC's must adapt
from short term to a three year horizon.
3. More emphasis in the form of strong leaders,
kncwledgable people and close management attention must be




4. The costs the PWC's use in estimating rates for the
budget years are generally overestimated, leading to
conservative figures most likely to produce a gain tc the
corpus.
5. Dnder rate stabilization, end-of-year operating
gains will probably be viewed more favorably by higher
authorities than operating losses. Although understandable,
this is contrary to the objectives of NIF management and
rate stabilization and will result in loss of some
purchasing power by the over-charged customer.
CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO CUSTOMERS
1. Rate stabilization did not improve the customers'
ability to estimate quantities of resources required for a
given budget period. Figure 1 indicated that with or
without rate stao ilizat ion, the ranges of quantity planning
variances were similar.
2. Rate stabilization has accomplished the objective of
enabling the activity to more effectively manage funds by
establishing a constant, direct relationship between
quantities of resources consumed and costs. Figure 1
indicated that this direct relationship existed after rate
stabilization, but not before.
3. Customer activities continue to receive





stabilization, to date, has therefore not helped the
customer activities to obtain funding levels to meet
increased costs.
4. The image of level funding violates the spirit of
the rate stabilization concept and negates any budgeting
benefits attributable to rate stabilization.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Eliminate the system of uniform payback, of gains and
losses and require each NIF activity to stand on its own
merits. This will strengthen the incentive of local NIF
managers to more effectively manage toward their operating
plan.
2. Iipleaent strict budgeting procedures through major
claimants to insure that funds identified to rate stabilized
functions are passed correctly to the ultimate customer so






While Chapter III addressed the budgetary implications
of the rate stabilization program, it only presented a
'micro' view, or category by category evaluation. Chapter
III identified the purpose of rate stabilization as customer
oriented: to permit the customer to execute the plan
developed in the budgeting phase. It further pointed out
the two-fold dilemma tc that problem:
1. The customer must be able to accurately predict his
resource requirements. Included in this is the ability to
develop an effective plan for execution.
2. The customer must be able to accurately cost oat his
predicted requirements, to ensure proper funds are budgeted.
This appendix draws the data together for a 'macro'
answer to the question: Does the rate stabilization program
enable the customer activities to budget more effectively?
The answer to this question is provided in a single figure
which represents the percentage of deviation that actual
results were of budgeted figures. 3oth aspects of the




E. UTILITIES A3 A SURROGATE
This appendix, as does Chapter III, uses the utilities
portion cf the budget for its analysis, as that portion
exhibits a raeasurability in units and cost per unit, bcth in
the budgeting and in the execution phases. Further, the
generalization is made that the utilities is sufficiently
representative of the overall PWC funds that the
effectiveness index developed represents the aggregated
customers' budgets for ?wc related areas. Chapter III
developed rationale supporting this generalization;
additional ratiounale is provided below:
1 • Measurab il
i
ty
Net only are the utility requirements programmed in
discrete, measurable units, but these requirements may be
estimated by proven techniques. A building of a certain type
construction and of a certain number of square feet will
require so much energy to heat and cool it. Using factors
such as fleet size and programmed fleet operations, an
estimate of power requirements to ships in port may be
determined. Further, overall base loading, age of
buildings, etc. will permit a sound estimate of all utility
requirements
.
2 • Cent rcl lab ilit
v
3asically, the expenditure of utilities is
relatively uncontrollable. 3y contrast, the other
categories considered (overhaul, repair, renovation and
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transportation) are mors controllable than utilities.
Decisions may be made by a command that, in order to reduce
expenditures (or to stay within budget)
, less planned
maintenance will be performed in a given year. The
requirement does not disappear, but gets backed into
subsequent years. On the other hand, a rational decision
cannot be made to not use a kilowatt hour of electricity.
Numerous other factors affect the consumption of
utilities, but by and large, these are beyond the control of
the customer.
A. Weather
It may be possible to predict nature, but it
cannot yet be controlled. The study of PWC San Diego almost
minimizes this factor, as its climate is one of the most
stable of any area in the United States. However,
deviations from established weather patterns will directly
affect the consumption of energy needed for heating or
cooling. The current west coast drought condition further
affects the need for fresh water. As these natural
phenomena occur, there is little a customer can do but react
by heating or cooling, or watering as conditions
necessitate.
Costs
Utilities are state controlled monopolies,
prices are approved (dictated) by Public Utilities
Commissions. Energy costs (heat, electricity) directly
reflect the tremendous increase in petroleum costs.
Customers (and PWC's) cannot control costs by shopping
around. The only alternative is self production, as PWC San
Diego does with steam. However, costs of raw materials
still directlv iioact the price of output. Since the 05M
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appropriations are a fixed amount, variances which occur in




Conservation conscious commands have been able
to reduce their utility consumption rate. However, the
direct results of conservation are not seen by the fellow
who adjusts the thermostat or turns the lights off cr on,
but by the fellow who pays the bill. Utility conservation
programs often grow old quickly as people become tired of
being cold or hot, or working in darkness. Further, any
reductions achieved by conservation measures are ultimately
incorporated in the estimating formulas, so a few years
later, budget estimates directly incorporate them and any
•savings' effect is negated.
3 • Percentage of Overa 1 1 Budget
The utilities are a significant portion of the
overall FWC services to customers. In the years analyzed,

















16,823,79 5 2 8.43
98,815,509 45.8^
The significant increase in FY 77 was due to the
radical change in AC electricity rates.
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C. THE EFFECTIVENESS INDEX
The ef f ectiveness index represents the percentage of
deviation that end-of- year





planning estimates and budgeted dollars. In order to
develop one such figure, a relationship must be developed
between budgeted and actual results, between quantities and
costs and among the various utility services.
1 • Quantity to Dollars
While the objective of the rate stabilization
program is to permit the customer to execute his plan, it
cannot be done without adequate funding. Quantity planning
figures represent an activity's best estimate of its
consumption for the year. The amount of dollars budgeted,
however, reflects not only costs of the estimated
consumption, but dollar ceilings imposed by higher
authorities. Further, while no direct ramifications occur
if an activity consumes more than estimated, over-obligation
of funds results in an H. S. 3679 violation. With these
considerations in mind, an arbitrary weighting of 40% is
assigned to the guantity factor and 60% is assigned to the
funds analysis. After the analysis is performed and the
index is generated, an uncertainty analysis is performed to
test the validity of the assumption.
2- Between Budgeted and Actual Results
Beth the quantities and the funds are analyzed as in
Chapter III. The factor developed is a ratio cf the
difference b€tween the budgeted and actual to the budgeted
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figures. As presented in Chapter III, this ratio doss not
consider -whether the actual results are more or less than
the budgeted amount, but rather how closely the results
approximated the budget. Therefore, the smaller the ratio,
the closer the results are to the budgeted figures. In the
equation a , Q I represents the quantity factor, an ' F'
represents the funding factor.
3
.
Among thn Various Utility Services
Since the final figure represents the entire
utilities budget, each utility service is weighted according
to its relative proportion of the total utilities budget.
While Chapter III displays the average percentage each
service was cf the total utilities budgets for FY 75, FY 76
and FY 7T, this appendix considers each year separately.
Further, since it is impossible to evaluate BTU ' s of steam
to kilowatt hours of electricity, or to gallons of water,
the proportion that the budgeted dollars for each service
are to the total utilities budget will be used as the
weighting factor. For example, in FY 75, the amount
budgeted for steam was $3,965,000 of a total budget of
$14,732,600 for a weight of .270. A ' W 1 represents the
weighting factor in the equation.
^ • The In dex Eq uation
Qsing the foregoing factors, a relationship for each
fiscal year is developed. The final sum is multiplied by
100 to convert to a percentage figure:





budgeted quantity - actual guantityl
budgeted quantity
I
budgeted funds - actual funds expended
budgeted funds
In this equation, the lower the Index, the closer
the actual results are to the budgeted estimates.
5. Analysis
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display all the pertinent data
for FY 75, FY 76 and FY 7T respectively. Based upon that
data, the effectiveness index, computed for each year, is
displayed below:
EFFECTIVENESS INDEX (Percentage of Deviation That
Actual Results were of 3udget)
FY "75 = 6.^1%
FY 76 = 10.94& (rate stabilized)
FY 7t = 2.20% (rate stabilized)
FY 77 was not analyzed, due to the inability to
identify specific quantities projected through the first six
months.
As in Chapter III, no specific conclusion is
presented. Considering that FY 76 was the first year of
implementation cf rate stabilization, the results are
interpreted as being not extremely out of line. From FY 7T
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results, however, it appears that rate stabilization is
providing an improvement in the customers' budgeting
abilities.
6 • Oncertaint y Analysis
Drafted with the proportions the way they are, the
Effectiveness Index slightly favors the non-rate stabilized
data, since the weighting factor ' W is based on dollars and
not output guantities. Further, the proportion between 'Q'
and 'F' favors the funds ratio, ' F', by 20%. To test the
stability of the Index, it is computed using different



















2 . D D /o
The above results show that by varying the
importance of the output criteria, Q, the Index for rate
stabilized years shows only minimal increases, while the
non-stabilized year jumps by over one-third. This is
interpreted that rate stabilization, oriented at customer
program accomplishment vice budget constraints, was
successful toward that end. This statement, however must be
cushioned as it is based on PWC data as a substitute for
customer data. The problems identified in Chapter 17
related to the individual customers' inability to really






The analysis of FY 75 performance predictably shows good
results, since the PWC has the experience of operating that
way for aany years. The interesting aspect is that, in
FY 76, with the first try, not only did rate stabilization
show good results, but came close to FY 75 performance. As
an added indication that this was no fluke, FY 7T's results
were better that FY 75' s, albeit only for a three month
period. Analysis of the entire FY 77 data should prove
that, at wcrst, rate stabilization budgeting is as good as
pre-rate stabilization. Therefore, given the wide spectrum
of management benefits accruing from rate stabilization, it
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